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Abstract. Although sloppy interpretation is usually accounted for by
theories of ellipsis, it often arises in non-elliptical contexts. In this paper,
a theory of sloppy interpretation is provided which captures this fact.
The underlying idea is that sloppy interpretation results from a semantic
constraint on parallel structures and the theory is shown to predict sloppy
readings for deaccented and paycheck sentences as well as relational-,
event-, and one-anaphora. It is further shown to capture the interaction
of sloppy/strict ambiguity with quantification and binding. Finally, it is
compared with other approaches to sloppy identity, in particular [4,12]
and [5].
1 Introduction
Sloppy interpretation involves two clauses: a source or antecedent clause and
a target clause that is, a clause containing a proform (the target proform).
When the antecedent of the target proform also contains a proform (the source
proform), a sloppy interpretation may arise. In this case, the interpretation of
the target proform differs from the interpretation of its source antecedent in the
interpretation of the source proform. For instance, in:
Example 1. Jon1 [washes his1 car]
2. Peter does2 too.
the VP-ellipsis does has, among others, the sloppy interpretation washes Peter’s
car (indeed, this is the preferred reading). The interpretation is sloppy because
whereas in the source clause Jon washes his car the source proform his is inter-
preted as Jon, in the target clause Peter does too, it is re-interpreted as Peter.
Although it is most often associated with VP-ellipsis, the phenomenon of
sloppy identity is in fact very pervasive, and can occur in a wide range of config-
urations for instance: deaccenting (example 2 where the deaccented material is in
bold face), paycheck sentences (example 3), VPE as a source proform (examples
4 and 5), non-pronominal referential elements involving implicit arguments (ex-
amples 6 and 7), event anaphora (examples 8 and 9) and one-anaphora (example
10)1.
1 The material occuring between brackets represents the interpretation being consid-
ered, in this case, the sloppy interpretation. Most examples are from [15].
Example 2. Jon1 took his1 wife to the station. No, BILL took his wife to the
station. (Bill took Bill’s wife to the station)
Example 3. Jon1 spent [his1 paycheck]
2 but Peter saved it2. (Peter saved Peter’s
paycheck)
Example 4. I’ll [help you]1 if you [want me to1]
2. I’ll kiss you even if you don’t2.
(I’ll kiss you even if you don’t want me to kiss you)
Example 5. When Harry [drinks]1, I always conceal [my belief that he shouldn’t1]
2.
When he gambles, I can’t conceal it2. (When he gambles, I can’t conceal my belief
that he shouldn’t gamble)
Example 6. Jon went to a local bar to watch the Super-bowl, and Bob did too.
(Bob went to a bar local to Bob)
Example 7. George drove to the nearest hospital, and Fred did too. (Fred drove
to the hospital nearest to Fred)
Example 8. Jon1 got shot by his1 father. That happened to Bob too. (Bob got
shot by Bob’s father)
Example 9. Jon1 kissed his1 wife, and Bill followed his example (Dahl, 1972)
(Bill kissed Bill’s wife)
Example 10. Although Jon1 bought a picture of his1 son, Bill snapped one him-
self. (Bill snapped a picture of Bill’s son)
In short, sloppy interpretation can result from many combinations of source and
target proform. Nevertheless most theories of sloppiness are restricted either to
VPE or to Paycheck Pronouns thus failing to capture this obvious generalisation.
What are the constraints on sloppy interpretation? We claim that paral-
lelism plays a fundamental role in triggering sloppiness. Specifically, it seems
that sloppy interpretation is only possible when the antecedent of the source
proform has a parallel counterpart in the target clause (cf. [4]). The following
examples illustrate this. In example (11), Jon has a parallel counterpart in the
target clause and consequently, a sloppy interpretation is possible. This sloppy
interpretation is however not available in (12) where Bill has no parallel coun-
terpart.
Example 11. The policeman who arrested Bill1 [forgot to read him1 his1 rights]
2
and so did2 the policeman who arrested Jon.
Example 12. The policeman who arrested Bill1 [forgot to read him1 his1 rights]
2
and so did2 Peter.
Of course, sloppy/strict ambiguity is not systematic in that interaction with
other linguistic phenomena may block one or the other of the two possible read-
ings. For instance in (13), interaction with quantification results in ruling out
a strict reading. Similarly, in example (14), interaction with binding excludes a
strict reading. Finally, example (15) shows that the sloppy/strict ambiguity is
sensitive to the Pronoun/PN distinction: the source proform must be a pronoun
(and not a proper name) for sloppiness to be possible.
Example 13. Every1 man believes he1 is a fool. No, PETER believes he is a fool.
(sloppy only)
Example 14. Mary persuaded Jon1 to shave himself1. No, Mary persuaded PE-
TER to shave himself. (sloppy only)
Example 15. Jon’s mother loves Jon and Bill’s mother does too (strict only)
In summary, a theory of sloppiness should be general enough to encompass the
various configurations in which sloppy/strict ambiguity may arise while correctly
accounting for the parallelism constraint illustrated by examples (11) and (12).
Furthermore, it should predict the interaction of sloppy/strict ambiguity with
such independent phenomena as quantification, binding theory and syntactic
categorisation.
In this paper, I present a theory of sloppiness which adheres to these re-
quirements. The proposed analysis is based on a simple parallelism constraint
which is claimed to govern the interpretation of parallel propositions. In essence,
this constraint requires that parallel structures share a non-trivial part of their
semantics. Crucially, this constraint is stated in terms of equations and solved
using Higher-Order Unification. It is the use of this particular mechanism which
allows us to make the appropriate linguistic predictions: the multiple solutions
generated by HOU mirror the sloppy/strict of natural language.
However, HOU is also known to systematically over-generate in that it yields
solutions which although they are mathematically valid, are linguistically incor-
rect. To overcome this problem, we use a form of HOU developed for guiding
inductive theorem proving, namely Higher-Order Coloured Unification (HOCU).
The basic idea is that HOCU provides a general framework in which to model
the interface between semantic construction and other levels of linguistic infor-
mation. As we shall see, this yields a linguistically plausible way of avoiding
over-generation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the fundamentals of
HOCU, and presents the analysis we propose. Section 3 shows that this analysis
predicts the fact that both ellipsis and deaccenting may give rise to sloppy/strict
ambiguity, section 4 that it naturally extends to paycheck pronouns, and section
5 that it encompasses those cases of sloppy/strict ambiguity in which the source
proform is a VP-ellipsis. In section 6, I review the remaining sloppy/strict con-
figurations and briefly indicate how they can be dealt with. Section 7 focuses on
the interaction of sloppiness with quantification, binding and syntax. Section 8
compares the approach with previous proposals and in particular [12], [4] and
[5]. Section 9 concludes with pointers to further research.
2 The analysis
Our analysis of sloppy identity falls out of an independent constraint on paral-
lel structures. In [8], I argue that this constraint yields a simple treatment of
deaccenting and of its relationship to ellipsis. In this paper, I show that it also
provides a general theory of sloppy identity.
The parallelism constraint is a semantic constraint which governs the inter-
pretation of parallel structures. Following [4] (henceforth, DSP), we take the
structuring of parallelism as given, that is, we assume that parallel elements
are known. The language used for semantic representation is the typed lambda
calculus and discourse anaphors such as ellipses and discourse pronouns are rep-
resented by free variables of the appropriate type. For instance, a VP-ellipsis
is assigned the semantic representation P(e,t) that is, a property variable. The
parallelism constraint is as follows.
Given SSem and TSem, the semantic representations of the source and
target utterances and SP1, . . . , SPn, TP1, . . . , TPn, the semantic repre-
sentations of the source and target parallel elements, the interpretation
of parallel utterances must obey the following equations:
SSem = A(SP1), . . . , (SPn)
TSem = A(TP1), . . . , (TPn)
Crucially, these equations are resolved using Higher–Order Coloured Unification.
Given the equation (M = N), the unification problem consists in finding a
well-formed coloured substitution of terms for free variables that will make M
and N equal in the theory of αβη–identity. For instance, given the equation
l(j,m) = R(j), a possible solution is the substitution which assigns λx.l(x,m)
to R, written {R ← λx.l(x,m)}. As a result, any free variable occuring in the
equations (and in particular any free variable representing a discourse anaphor)
is assigned a value. As we shall see, this method yields a uniform account of
sloppy/strict ambiguity.
What precisely is Higher-Order Coloured Unification (HOCU) and how does
it differ from standard HOU? For a precise description of HOCU, the reader
is referred to [14]. Briefly, the important difference is that HOCU operates on
a variant of the simply typed λ-calculus where symbol occurrences other than
bound variables can be annotated with colours. Further, colours can be either
constants or variables and restrict the unification process as follows. Colour
variables unify both with colour variables and with colour constants. In contrast,
a colour constant can only unify with the same colour constant. Further, variables
labelled with colour constants are subject to the following restriction.
For any colour constant c and any c–coloured variable Vc, a well–formed
coloured substitution must assign to Vc a c–monochrome term i.e., a
term whose symbols are c–coloured.
Why use HOCU? As we have already shown (cf. [9]), the intuition is that colours
allows us to create an interface between semantic construction and other sources
of linguistic knowledge. In this paper, we shall see that it is particularly useful
in avoiding over-generation. We now illustrate this point by a simple example.
Consider (16).
Example 16. Jon1 likes his1 wife. Peter does too.
In an HOU setting, the parallelism constraint yields the following equations for
this discourse (recall that ellipses are represented using free variables; thus here
R represents the ellipsis does too):
l(j, wife of(j)) = A(j)
R(p) = A(p)
Resolution of the first equation yields a total of 4 solutions, namely:
{A← λx.l(x, wife of(x))}
{A← λx.l(x, wife of(j))}
{A← λx.l(j, wife of(x))}
{A← λx.l(j, wife of(j))}
Linguistically, only the first two solutions are valid. The last two are invalid
because they would yield an incorrect semantics for the discourse in (16), namely:
Jon likes Jon’s wife and Jon likes Peter’s wife.
Jon likes Jon’s wife and Jon likes Jon’s wife.
Intuitively, the problem is that the term occurrence representing the source sub-
ject appears in the target representation, and that it may not do so. To capture
this intuition, DSP introduce the Primary Occurrence Restriction (POR) which
in essence aims at ensuring that the term(s) representing the source parallel
element(s) do not occur in the solution.
Primary Occurrence Restriction
Given a labeling of occurrences as either primary or secondary, the POR
excludes from the set of linguistically valid solutions, any solution which
contains a primary occurrence.
Within the HOCU framework, the POR finds a natural encoding: primary occur-
rences are p-coloured whilst the free variable representing an ellipsis is s-coloured.
Since a well-formed coloured substitution only assigns to a c-coloured free vari-
able (where c is a colour constant), a c-monochrome term, it follows that the
term assigned to an ellipsis variable (Rs) may not contain any primary occur-
rence (because primary occurrences are p-coloured and p 6= s). Coming back to
example (16), the HOCU equations are (here and in what follows, we ignore
irrelevant colours; A,B are colour variables):
l(jp, wife of(jA)) = AB(jp)
Rs(pp) = AB(pp)
For which, the following substitutions are well-formed coloured substitutions
{Rs ← λx.l(x, wife of(x)), AB ← λx.l(x, wife of(x))}
{Rs ← λx.l(x, wife of(js)), AB ← λx.l(x, wife of(jA))}
but not these:
{Rs ← λx.l(jp, wife of(x)), AB ← λx.l(jp, wife of(x))}
{Rs ← λx.l(jp, wife of(js)), AB ← λx.l(jp, wife of(jA))}
To summarise: because HOU can yield several solutions (rather than a single
one), it allows us to capture the sloppy/strict ambiguity displayed in natural
language discourse. And because we use HOCU (rather than straight HOU), we
can eliminate from the set of solutions, those solutions that are linguistically
invalid. For more details on the applications of HOCU to natural language se-
mantics, we refer the reader to ([9]). In what follows, we will omit colours unless
they are used for something else than the POR. Concretely, this means that
colours will only re-appear in section 7, where we concentrate on the interaction
between semantic construction and other sources of linguistic information.
3 Sloppy identity in ellipsis and deaccenting contexts
It has often been observed (cf. [19,1,18]) that VP-ellipsis and deaccenting (i.e.
prosodic reduction) share a number of interpretive similarities and in particular
that they both give rise to sloppy/strict ambiguity. Thus in (18), the target VP
took his wife to the station is deaccented, and like the elided VP in (17), it can be
interpreted either strictly or sloppily (upper letters indicate prosodic prominence
and bold face deaccented material).
Example 17. Jon1 took his1 wife to the station. No, BILL did.
Example 18. Jon1 took his1 wife to the station. No, BILL took his wife to the
station.
Interestingly, this is exactly what the parallelism constraint predicts. Thus in
the VPE case, the parallelism constraint requires that the following equations
hold:
tk(j, wife of(j), s) = A(j)
R(b) = A(b)
Resolving the first equation yields two possible values for A:
{A← λx.tk(x, wife of(x), s)}
{A← λx.tk(x, wife of(j), s)}
And consequently, the target clause receives two interpretations, either
tk(b, wife of(b), s) or tk(b, wife of(j), s) – as required. Now consider the deac-
centing case. As for the ellipsis case, we assume that anaphors in the source
are resolved whereas discourse anaphors in the target are represented using free
variables (alternatively, we could resolve them first and let HOU filter unsuitable
resolutions out). Specifically, the target pronoun his is represented by the free
variable x and the equations to be solved are:
tk(j, wife of(j), s) = A(j)
tk(b, wife of(x), s) = A(b)
The first equation is resolved as before, thereby yielding two possibilities for the
second equation:
tk(b, wife of(x), s) = tk(b, wife of(b), s)
tk(b, wife of(x), s) = tk(b, wife of(j), s)
It follows that x can unify either to j or to b and accordingly, the target pronoun
his is interpreted as either strict (Jon) or sloppy (Bill).
Another interesting fact about sloppy interpretation in deaccenting and VP
ellipsis contexts is that it may involve an extended domain of licensing that is,
a domain that extends beyond the clausal level. For instance, [18] notes that in
(19) and (20), both the deaccented I was bad-mouthing her and the elliptical
I was can be assigned the sloppy interpretation: I was bad-mouthing Sue even
though Sue is not part of the anaphoric clause.
Example 19. First, Jon told Mary1 I was bad-mouthing her1, and then he told
SUE I was.
Example 20. First, Jon told Mary1 I was bad-mouthing her1, and then he told
SUE I was bad-mouthing her.
More generally, the interpretation of both ellipsis and deaccenting can depend on
elements which occur outwith their governing categories. This suggests that the
semantic licensing of these two phenomena occurs at the sentential rather than
at the clausal level. Again this falls out of the parallelism constraint: since this
constraint operates on utterance representations, it is not restricted to clauses
but may indifferently apply either to clauses or to sentences. Specifically, the
analysis for the above examples goes as follows.
For the ellipsis case, the equations are:
t(j,m, bm(i,m)) = A(m)
t(x, s, R(i)) = A(s)
Solving the first equation yields λz.t(j, z, bm(i, z)) and λz.t(j, z, bm(i,m)) as pos-
sible values forA. By substitution and β-reductionA(s) is then either t(j, s, bm(i, s))
or t(j, s, bm(i,m)) and the resulting equations are resolved by the following sub-
stitutions:
{x← j, R← λz.bm(z,m)}
{x← j, R← λz.bm(z, s)}
where the first solution yields the strict reading, the second the sloppy. Resolu-
tion of the deaccenting case can similarly be summarised as follows. This time,
the equations resulting from the parallelism constraint are:
t(j,m, bm(i,m)) = A(m)
t(x, s, bm(i, y)) = A(s)
As before, resolving the first equation yields two possible values for A namely,
λz.t(j, z, bm(i, z)) and λz.t(j, z, bm(i,m)). Similarly, A(s) is then either
t(j, s, bm(i, s)) or t(j, s, bm(i,m)). Consequently, (20) also receives both a strict
and a sloppy interpretation.
Finally, deaccenting may involve more complex cases of sloppy interpretation
as illustrated by the following examples.
Example 21. Jon1 said he1 was clever. No, PETER said he was intelligent.
Example 22. The policeman who arrested Jon1 forgot to read him1 his1 rights
and so did the one PETER got collared by.
Example (21) is a straightforward deaccenting example where the deaccented
material differs in its lexical realisation from its source counterpart; example
(22) is more complex and involves both deaccenting and VP-ellipsis. Both cases
trigger a sloppy/strict ambiguity in the interpretation of the target clause.
The important point is that in such cases, ellipsis and deaccenting differ in
the semantic relation they require to hold between source and target utterances.
In the ellipsis case, the relation is one of syntactic identity: the semantic repre-
sentation of the ellipsis in the target clause must be identical with the semantic
representation of part of the source clause. In the case of deaccenting, the relation
is more subtle. Consider (23) for instance.
Example 23. First, JON called Mary a Republican and then PETER insulted
her.
[18] argues that in such cases, entailment is involved in licensing prosodic reduc-
tion: (23) is licensed by the implication that ‘if x calls y a republican, then x
insults y’ and consequently, the deaccented clause is interpreted as Peter insulted
Mary. Note that through the entailment, her is resolved to Mary.
However, Rooth himself notes that the licensing relation between a deac-
cented sentence and its source, need not always be entailment. Thus in examples
(24), (25) and (26), there is clearly no entailment relation holding between source
and target clause.
Example 24. He bit her and then SHE punched HIM.
Example 25. Tell me who assaulted whom? HE bit HER.
Example 26. First, a policeman arrested Peter and then PAUL got collared by
one.
Rather, the requirement seems to be that the two clauses entail a (reasonably
specific) common proposition of a more general form. For instance, the deaccent-
ing in (26) seems to be licensed by the fact that both x arrest y and x collared
y entail that x did something nasty to y (note that if I say First, a policeman
arrested Peter and then PAUL was invited to TEA by one, I have to stress was
invited to TEA). More specifically, one could follow [19] and argue that deaccent-
ing is licensed provided (XS ⊃ Y ) ∧ (XT ⊃ Y ) where XS , XT are the semantic
representations of the source and target clauses respectively, and Y is such that
it subsumes XS and XT and it is entailed by XS and XT .
Now, whatever the relation is, which holds between a deaccented clause and
its source, the above data is clearly problematic for the HOU approach. In such
cases, the semantic representation of the deaccented material will differ from that
of its parallel counterpart in the source and therefore HOU (which is essentially
a matching operation on syntactic structures) will fail thus failing to account for
some perfectly acceptable discourses.
There is an intuitively natural solution to this problem. As we already argued
in [10,8], a variant of HOU is required to deal with the semantics of deaccenting
namely, HOU augmented with logical relations (HOU+R, cf. [16]). Crucially,
this form of unification takes into account not only syntactic αβη-identity, but
also any logical relation we care to specify. For instance, if the specified relation
is entailment, the equation (M = N) will be solved by HOU+R if either M and
N syntactically unify or if it can be proved that M entails N . The point is that
whatever the relation is which we find, holds between a deaccented clause and
its source, we can integrate it into the HOU framework (provided it’s a logical
relation). Briefly, the HOU+R approach consists in combining HOU with theo-
rem proving. Specifically, each time an intermediate equation (M = N) of type
t is found, the theorem prover is called to try and prove that R(M,N) (where
R is the specific relation HOU is incremented with). Thus, if we assume that
source and target clause must share a common property, any attempt to solve
(M = N) will trigger the attempt to prove that (M ⊃ Y ) ∧ (N ⊃ Y ) where Y
subsumes both M and N . For a more detailed presentation of HOU+R, we refer
the reader to [16]; for a discussion of how this form of unification can be used
for deaccenting, see [10,8]. We now briefly sketch how such cases can be handled
within the HOU+R framework. Consider example (22) with sloppy interpreta-
tion The policeman who Peter got collared by forgot to read Peter Peter’s rights.
The equations to be resolved are:
∃x[po(x) ∧ ar(x, j) ∧ f(x, rd(x, j, j′sr))] = A(j)
∃x[Q(x) ∧ col(x, p) ∧R(x)] = A(p)
Solving the first equation yields (we concentrate on the sloppy reading):
{A← λz.∃x[po(x) ∧ ar(x, z) ∧ f(x, rd(x, z, z′sr))]}
Consequently, the second equation becomes
∃x[Q(x) ∧ col(x, p) ∧R(x)] = ∃x[po(x) ∧ ar(x, p) ∧ f(x, rd(x, p, p′sr))]
For which, a possible solution is: {Q ← λz.po(z), R ← λz.f(z, rd(z, p, p′sr))}
After substitution, the lhs of the equation is then:
∃x[po(x) ∧ col(x, p) ∧ f(x, rd(x, p, p′sr))]
That is, the underspecified semantics of the target so did the one Peter got col-
lared by has correctly been resolved to the policeman who arrested Peter forgot to
read Peter Peter’s rights. Note however that the equation is not solved. Rather,
we’ve reached a situation in which no free variable occurs but still left and right-
hand sides are not identical. Within the HOU+R setting, an attempt will then
be made to prove that R holds between both sides of the equation. In this case,
the theorem prover must prove that both sides of the equations entail a common
more general proposition. Specifically, it must be proved that:
∃x[po(x) ∧ ar(x, p) ∧ f(x, rd(x, p, p′sr)) ⊃ Y ]∧
∃x[po(x) ∧ col(x, p) ∧ f(x, rd(x, p, p′sr)) ⊃ Y ]
Since tableaux are refutation systems, we in fact try to prove the negation of this
formula and aim for a contradiction. During the proof process, each conjunctive
formula can be broken down into its conjuncts which are then added to the
current tableau branch. Conversely, a disjunctive formula triggers a branching of
the tree whereby each new branch is labelled with one of the disjuncts. Universal
and existential formulas license the addition of an instantiation of this formula to
the current branch (whereby the instantiation drops the quantifier and replaces
the bound variable by an unused free variable in the case of a universal and by a
new skolem term in the case of an existential). Finally, if both X1 and ¬X2 occur
on the same tableau branch, and if a substitution can be found which makes X1
and X2 equal, the branch is closed. When all tableau branches are closed, the
theorem is proved (for a more precise definition of the tableau method, see e.g.
[6]). The tableau for the above example can be sketched as follows. In a first
phase, we get (we abbreviate f(x, rd(x, p, p′sr)) to fr(x, p)):
(1) ∀x∀y[ar(x, y) ⊃ nasty(x, y)]
(2) ∀x∀y[col(x, y) ⊃ nasty(x, y)]
(3) ar(v1, v2) ⊃ nasty(v1, v2)
(4) col(v3, v4) ⊃ nasty(v3, v4)
(5) ¬(∃x[po(x) ∧ ar(x, p) ∧ fr(x, p) ⊃ Y ] ∧ ∃x[po(x) ∧ col(x, p) ∧ fr(x, p) ⊃ Y ])
(6) ¬∃x[po(x) ∧ ar(x, p) ∧ fr(x, p) ⊃ Y ] ¬∃x[po(x) ∧ col(x, p) ∧ fr(x, p) ⊃ Y ]
1 and 2 formalise the fact that we assume a context where if x arrests y,
then x is nasty to y and further if x collars y, then x is nasty to y. 3 and 4 are
from 1 and 2 by instantiation (where vi are new free variables). 5 is the negation
of what has to be proved. Since ¬(X ∧ Y ) is a disjunctive formula, the tableau
branches and its disjuncts ¬X and ¬Y are added to the new branches. We now
show the continuing derivation for the left branch (the right branch develops in
a similar way). For readability, we add lines 3 and 6 of the beginning tableau to
the continuing tableau.
(3) ar(v1, v2) ⊃ nasty(v1, v2)
(6) ¬∃x[po(x) ∧ ar(x, p) ∧ fr(x, p) ⊃ Y ]
(7) ¬[po(v1) ∧ ar(v1, p) ∧ fr(v1, p) ⊃ Y ]
(8) po(v1) ∧ ar(v1, p) ∧ fr(v1, p)
(9) ¬Y
(10) po(v1)
(11) ar(v1, p)
(12) fr(v1, p)
(13) ¬ar(v1, v2) nasty(v1, v2)
{v2 ← p} {Y ← nasty(v1, v2)}
⋆ ⋆
7 is from 6 by instantiation. Since ¬(X ⊃ Y ) is a conjunctive formula with
conjuncts X and ¬Y , lines 8 and 9 are added to the tableau (from 7). Sim-
ilarly, lines 10, 11 and 12 are from line 8 (because line 8 is labelled with a
conjunctive formula). At this stage, the disjunctive formula in (3) is used and
the tree branches yielding (13). By using the indicated bindings, we derive the
contradictions ¬ar(v1, p)∧ar(v1 , p) for the leftmost branch, and ¬ nasty(v1, p)∧
nasty(v1, p) for the rightmost one. Since both branches are closed, the tableau
is closed and proposition (1) is proved. Thus HOU+R succeeds thereby yielding
the appropriate sloppy interpretation for the target clause So did the one Peter
got collared by.
4 Paycheck Pronouns
Why does the parallelism constraint predict paycheck pronouns? Intuitively, the
reason is that as in the ellipsis case, the λ-term shared by source and target
utterances may contain the representation of a pronoun. When the antecedent
of this pronoun is a parallel element, HOU predicts that this pronoun can behave
sloppily. Let us see in more detail how this works. Consider example (27).
Example 27. Jon1 spent [his1 paycheck]
2 but Peter saved it2.
The pronoun it occurring in the second clause has a sloppy interpretation in that
it can be interpreted as meaning Peter’s paycheck, rather than Jon’s paycheck.
In the literature such pronouns are known as paycheck pronouns and are treated
as introducing a definite whose restriction is pragmatically given (cf. e.g. [2]).
Within our proposal, we can straightforwardly capture this intuition by assigning
paycheck pronouns the following representation:
Pro❀ λQ.∃x[P (x) ∧ ∀y[P (y)→ y = x] ∧Q(x)] with P ∈ wff(e→t)
That is, paycheck pronouns are treated as definites whose restriction (P ) is a
variable of type (e → t). Furthermore, we assume that paycheck pronouns like
VP-ellipses, occur in parallel structures and hence are subject to the parallelism
constraint. Under these assumption the following equations must hold (we ab-
breviate λQ.∃x[P (x) ∧ ∀y[P (y)→ y = x] ∧Q(x)] toλQ.∃1x[P (x) ∧Q(x)]):
∃1x[pc of(x, j) ∧ sp(j, x)] = A(j, sp)
∃1x[P (x) ∧ sa(p, x)] = A(p, sa)
Resolving the first equation yields λy.λO.∃1x[pc of(x, y) ∧ O(y, x)] as a value
for A so that A(p, sa) = ∃1x[pc of(x, p) ∧ sa(p, x)] and {P ← λy.pc of(y, p)}.
That is, the target clause is correctly assigned the sloppy interpretation: Peter
saved Peter’s paycheck.
5 Source proform: VPE
So far, we have considered cases of sloppy interpretation in which the source
proform is a pronoun. Interestingly however, the source proform can also be a
VP ellipsis. This is illustrated by the following examples (from [12]).
Example 28. I’ll [help you]1 if you [want me to1]
2. I’ll kiss you even if you don’t2.
Example 29. When Harry [drinks]1, I always conceal [my belief that he shouldn’t1]
2.
When he gambles, I can’t conceal it2.
In (28), the target proform is a VPE whose antecedent contains a VPE. In
other words, the source proform is a VPE. Similarly, in (29), the target proform
is a pronoun with a VPE as a source proform. Both examples have a sloppy
interpretation: I’ll kiss you even if you don’t want me to kiss you (instead of
help you in the source clause) and I can’t conceal the belief that he shouldn’t
gamble (instead of he shouldn’t drink in the source clause).
What these (and the previous) examples show, is that sloppy interpreta-
tion is independent of whether the source and the target proforms are VPEs
or pronominal anaphors. A correct theory of sloppy interpretation must there-
fore be general enough to encompass all possible cases in a uniform way. This
is predicted by our account where sloppy interpretation follows, not from the
treatment of VPE and paycheck pronouns, but from their interaction with the
parallelism constraint. In what follows we show that our approach accounts for
examples (28) and (29) thus covering the four possible configurations for sloppy
interpretation illustrated in table (1) where boxes surround the source and tar-
get proforms. Consider (28) first. Assuming that the parallel elements are help
and kiss respectively, the parallelism constraint requires that
h(i, you)← wt(you, h(i, you)) = A(h)
k(i, you)← P (you)) = A(k)
Source Utterance Target Utterance
Configuration NPj , . . . , [V P , . . . , PRO j , . . . , ]
i , . . . , VPE i, . . . ,
Example Jonj [V P washes his j car]
i Peter does i too.
Configuration VPj , . . . , [V P , . . . , VPE j , . . . , ]
i , . . . , VPE i, . . . ,
Example I’ll [help you]j, if you [V P want me to j ]
i I’ll kiss you even if you don’t i.
Configuration NPj , . . . , [NP , . . . , PRO j , . . . , ]
i , . . . , PRO i, . . . ,
Example Jonj spent [NP his j paycheck]
i but Peter saved it i.
Configuration VPj , . . . , [NP , . . . , VPE j , . . . , ]
i , . . . , PRO i, . . . ,
Example When Harry [drinks]j , I conceal When he gambles,
[NP my belief that he shouldn’t j ]
i I can’t conceal it i.
Table 1. Ellipsis, Pronouns and sloppiness
Resolution of the first equation yields λR.(R(i, you)← wt(you,R(i, you))) as a
possible value for A so that the value for A(k) is:
λR.(R(i, you)← wt(you,R(i, you))(k) = A(k)
or equivalently k(i, you)← wt(you, k(i, you)). Indirectly then, the value of P is
now λx.wt(i, k(i, x)) so that the VPE occurring in the second clause is correctly
interpreted as meaning want me to kiss you.
Similarly, the derivation for (29) proceeds as follows. This time we assume
that drinks and gambles are the parallel elements so that the parallelism con-
straint gives rise to the following equations:
dk(h)→ ∃x[bel(x, sn(dk(h))) ∧ hide(i, x)] = A(dk)
gb(h)→ ∃x[P (x) ∧ hide(i, x)] = A(gb)
Resolving the first equation yields λR.(R(h)→ ∃x[bel(x, sn(R(h)))∧hide(i, x)])
as a possible value for A. By β-reduction, the value of A(gb) is then gb(h) →
∃x[bel(x, sn(gb(h))) ∧ hide(i, x)] and P is resolved to λy.bel(y, sn(gb(h))). That
is the second clause of the target utterance is interpreted as meaning I can’t
conceal my belief that Harry shouldn’t gamble and thereby the pronoun it is
sloppily resolved to my belief that Harry shouldn’t gamble.
6 Other sloppy constructions
[15] lists a number of constructions where sloppy/strict ambiguity is possible.
We now consider these cases. The first construction involves implicit referential
arguments and is exemplified in (30).
Example 30. Jon went to a local bar to watch the Super-bowl, and Bob did too.
(Bob went to a bar local to Bob/Jon)
If these implicit arguments are taken to be present in the semantic representa-
tion, those cases are unproblematic. For instance, the equations for (30) are:
∃x[ bar(x) ∧ loc(x, j) ∧ went(j, x, watch(j, sb))] = A(j)
R(b) = A(b)
Solving the first equation yields two solutions for A, namely
{A← λz.∃x[ bar(x) ∧ loc(x, z) ∧ went(z, x, watch(z, sb))]}
{A← λz.∃x[ bar(x) ∧ loc(x, j) ∧ went(z, x, watch(z, sb))]}
The first solution yields the sloppy reading and the second, the strict.
Another construction listed in [15] is one involving either pronominal (31) or
definite (32) event anaphora.
Example 31. Jon got shot by his father. That happened to Bob too. (Bob got
shot by Bob/Jon’s father)
Example 32. Jon kissed his wife, and Bill followed his example (Dahl, 1972) (Bill
kissed Jon/Bill’s wife)
Here the question arises as to how expressions such as that happened and fol-
lowed x’s example should be represented. Without going into any details about
these constructions, it seems reasonable to assume that these expressions are
essentially anaphors in that their meaning is determined by the context. Under
this assumption, the second clause of (31) and (32) is then represented as R(b)
and the equations for e.g. (31) are:
shot(f(j), j) = A(j)
R(b) = A(b)
As usual, resolution of the first equation gives us two solutions, one sloppy ({R←
λz. shot(f(z), z)}) and one strict ({R← λz. shot(f(j), z)}).
One-anaphora also permits sloppy/strict ambiguity.
Example 33. Although Jon bought a picture of his son, Bill snapped one himself.
We can capture this by treating one-anaphora similarly to paycheck pronouns
that is, as definites whose restriction is pragmatically given. Under this assump-
tion, the equations for (33) are:
∃x[pic of(x, j′s son) ∧ bo(j, x)] = A(j, bo)
∃x[P (x) ∧ sna(b, x)] = A(b, sna)
The sloppy interpretation is given by the solution
{A← λzλy.∃x[pic of(x, z′s son) ∧ y(z, x)]}
and the strict reading by the second solution
{A← λzλy.∃x[pic of(x, j′s son) ∧ y(z, x)]}
7 Interaction with syntax and quantification
As should be clear from the above discussion, our analysis predicts a systematic
ambiguity between strict and sloppy interpretation. However, there are certain
constraints on this ambiguity which result from the interaction of parallelism
with other linguistic phenomena. We now consider these constraints.
Syntax Categorial information can affect sloppy/strict ambiguity. Thus al-
though (34) has two readings, one strict and one sloppy, (35) can only have
the strict reading.
Example 34. Jon1’s mother loves him1 and Bill’s mother does too (sloppy/strict)
Example 35. Jon’s mother loves Jon and Bill’s mother does too (strict only)
Within the standard (that is, non-coloured) HOU framework, such examples
are problematic because (34) and (35) have the same semantic representation
and therefore, there is no way in which they can be distinguished. In other
words, both examples will be predicted to be sloppy/strict ambiguous. However
within the HOCU framework, colours can be used to create an interface between
semantic construction and other levels of linguistic information. In section 2, we
saw that pronouns are variable coloured and hence can give rise either to a strict
or to a sloppy interpretation of the target. For full NPs, we stipulate that they
be s-coloured. Given this, the equations for (35) are:
l(m(jp), js) = AB(jp)
Rs(m(bp)) = AB(bp)
Crucially, resolution of the first equation yields only one solution, not two,
namely AB = λz.l(m(z), js) – this yields the strict reading. By contrast, the
sloppy reading is ruled out because the corresponding substitution {AB ←
λz.l(m(z), z)} is not a unifier for the given equations. To see this, it suffices
to apply this substitution to the right-hand side of the equation, AB(jp). This
yields λz.l(m(z), z)(jp) which by β-reduction is equivalent to l(m(jp), jp). But
this does not unify with the left-hand side of the equation because of the colour-
clash on the second occurrence of j. Hence the sloppy reading is ruled out.
Scope constraints Quantification also constrains sloppiness. This is illustrated
by the following examples.
Example 36. Every1 man believes he1 is a fool. No, PETER believes he is a fool.
(sloppy only)
Example 37. Jon lost a1 book and never got it1 back. No, Peter lost a PEN and
never got it back (sloppy only)
In both (36) and (37), the source pronoun has a quantified antecedent and fur-
thermore, this quantified NP does not scope over the target utterance. As a
result, only the sloppy interpretation is possible. The strict interpretation is
ruled out because it would involve a free variable, the variable introduced by the
source quantified antecedent and occuring in the target representation. Under
our analysis, this constraint simply follows from general constraints on substi-
tutions which essentially say that a free variable may never become bound and
vice-versa. Thus for (36), the parallelism constraint requires that the following
equations hold (as in DSP, when a proper name has a quantified parallel element,
we use the type-raised representation of proper names to guarantee parallelism
of types):
∀x[b(x)→ bel(x, f(x))] = A(λP.∀x[b(x) → P (x)])
bel(p, f(y)) = A(λP.P (p))
To obtain the strict reading, the second equation needs to be resolved as follows:
{A← λQ.Q(λz.bel(z, f(x)), y← x}
Applying this substitution to the first equation, we then get
A(λP.∀x[b(x) → P (x)]) = λQ.Q(λz.bel(z, f(x))(λP.∀x[b(x)→ P (x)])
= λP.∀x[b(x) → P (x)](λz.bel(z, f(x)))
And at this point, the restrictions on well-formed substitutions requires that x
be renamed. Hence x can never be bound by the source quantifier every man.
Binding constraints As is illustrated by the following example, the binding
constraints also play a role in constraining strict interpretation.
Example 38. Mary persuaded Jon1 to shave himself1. No, Mary persuaded PE-
TER to shave himself. (sloppy only)
Here only the sloppy interpretation is possible. The most obvious explanation for
the missing strict reading (Peter shaved Jon) is that the resulting structure would
violate condition A of the binding theory according to which a reflexive must
be bound in its governing category. Now recall that we only require discourse
pronouns to be represented by free variables. In contrast, we take reflexive and
bound pronouns to be resolved at the sentential level and hence represented
either as constants or as bound variables. Given this, the lack of strict reading
in (38) above, straightforwardly follows from the parallelism constraint. The
equations are:
pe(m, sh(j, j)) = A(j)
pe(m, sh(p, p)) = A(p)
So that the only possible solution is {A← λx.pe(m, sh(x, x))}. In particular, the
solution which would yield a strict reading namely, {A← λx.pe(m, sh(x, j))} is
not a unifier since it cannot solve both equations simultaneously.
8 Comparison with other approaches
In this section, we briefly compare it with three alternative proposals: DSP’s
treatment of ellipsis (because it is closely related to our proposal); Hardt’s dy-
namic theory of ellipsis (because it uses a dynamic rather than a static semantics
and is in this sense, fundamentally different from our proposal) and Fiengo and
May’s LF approach (because contrary to our analysis which works on flat se-
mantic representations, this approach involves structured objects namely, logical
forms).
Let us first examine how our proposal relates to DSP’s treatment of ellipsis. In
DSP’s analysis, the semantic representation of the source clause is constrained to
be equal to R(S1, , . . . , Sn) where R is the semantic representation of the target
ellipsis and S1, , . . . , Sn are the semantic representations of the source parallel
elements (that is, the elements of the source clause which have an overt parallel
counterpart in the target clause). Reformulating DSP’s analysis in a way that
makes it more comparable to our proposal, we then have that the interpretation
of an elliptical clause must obey the following constraint:
S = R(S1), . . . , (Sn)
T = R(T1), . . . , (Tn)
where R is the semantic representation of the target ellipsis; S and T represent
the source and the target clause and S1, . . ., Sn, T1, . . . , Tn represent the source
and the target parallel elements respectively.
This looks a lot like our parallelism constraint. There is one important dif-
ference though: DSP’s analysis requires that the semantically underspecified ele-
ment whose value is to be determined by HOU, be the semantic representation of
a VP-ellipsis. By contrast, we only require that this semantically underspecified
element be the semantics shared by two parallel propositions.
This difference has several important consequences. First, it allows the treat-
ment of deaccenting (because the free variable R may represent overt rather than
elided material). Second, it captures the extended domain of licensing involved
in both ellipsis and deaccenting context (because the free variable need not rep-
resent an ellipsis but may extend over overt material containing an ellipsis).
Third, it enables a general theory of sloppy identity (since sloppiness is linked
to parallelism, not just ellipsis). Fourth, it allows us to preserve the assumption
that VPEs denote properties (in DSP’s analysis, the variable representing the
VPE is a relation of varying arity). This allows compatibility with Montague-
type grammars that is, grammars where the semantic type of a constituent is
defined by a mapping from syntactic categories into types.
We now turn to Hardt’s approach. In a dynamic setting, anaphors can be
viewed as denoting functions from contexts to semantic objects. Specifically,
an ellipsis can be viewed as a function from contexts to properties. As [7,12]
show, this simple observation suffices to predict sloppy/strict ambiguity: if the
antecedent of an ellipsis contains a pronoun, the value of this pronoun in the
source context may differ from its value in the target context. [12] further shows
that in a dynamic setting where pronouns and ellipsis are uniformly treated as
function from contexts to semantic objects, the free interplay between pronouns,
ellipsis and sloppy identity discussed in section 5 simply falls out.
There are at least two main differences between Hardt’s and our proposal.
First, Hardt’s proposal does not impose a parallelism constraint on sloppy iden-
tity. This has pros and cons. On the positive side, this means that the approach
encounters no difficulty in accounting for examples such as (22), where the non-
contrastive material in the target differs from its parallel counterpart in the
source. However, it also means that sloppy identity is unrestricted. In particu-
lar, a sloppy interpretation for (12) cannot be ruled out.
The second difference involves directionality. Dynamic semantics is inherently
directional in that within the semantic representation, the term representing an
anaphor must be preceded by the term representing its antecedent. As a result,
the dynamic approach correctly predicts that (39) lacks a sloppy interpretation
that is, the reading this year, I voted for Harry (example from [12]). Note that
by contrast, the HOU approach will predict both a strict and a sloppy reading
for the elliptic clause.
Example 39. Tom1 is always causing me problems. Last year, I didn’t vote for
him1 and Tom got mad at me. This year, I did, and HARRY got mad at me.
The blessing is mixed however, for consider the following example.
Example 40. Tom is always causing me problems. Last year, he got mad at me
because I didn’t vote for him and THIS year, HARRY got mad at me because I
did.
In this case, Harry does precede the ellipsis and consequently, the dynamic
approach predicts a sloppy reading. However, just as in (39), this reading is
simply not there. In short, I don’t think example (39) is a very decisive argument
in favour of the dynamic approach. As example (40) shows, the lack of sloppy
reading is due not to linear order, but to some other factor, possibly the semantics
of the contrast relation which holds between target and source or possibly, the
fact that Tom is the current discourse topic.
Finally, we consider [5]’s account (henceforth, FM). Under this account, ellip-
sis is taken to involve syntactic reconstruction and furthermore, different types
of NPs are represented differently. For instance, a proper name is always repre-
sented by an α-occurrence but a pronoun can be represented either as a β- or as
an α-occurrence. Importantly, reconstruction is sensitive to the α−β distinction
so that specific constraints on reconstruction can be stated which in essence,
aim at capturing the effect of binding on ellipsis reconstruction. In particular,
FM’s approach predicts the difference between full NPs and pronouns discussed
in section 7. It also accounts for the fact that example (41) lacks a strict-sloppy
reading that is, the reading Peter said Max saw Peter’s mother.
Example 41. Max1 said he1 saw his1 mother and Peter
2 did too
The HOCU approach presented here cannot explain this missing reading for the
simple reason that Co-indexed pronouns have identical representations and are
thus handled identically. Although I do no think the problem unsolvable, I will
leave it for now as an open issue.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a uniform treatment of sloppy interpretation which is general
enough to cover the cases of sloppy/strict ambiguity observed in the literature.
Moreover the treatment integrates a parallelism constraint which restricts sloppy
interpretation to those cases where the antecedent of the source proform has a
parallel counterpart in the target clause.
There are two obvious directions for further research. The first direction
concerns the determination of parallelism. A real weakness of the present paper
is that parallel elements are taken as given. This undermines the predictive
power of the approach in that there is a definite leeway in deciding what the
parallel elements can or may be. Roughly, there are two types of approach to
this problem. Either, the parallel elements are determined through some general
constraint on parallelism and contrast (cf. e.g. [13]), or they are defined through
some matching mechanism on semantic representations such as priority union
(cf. e.g. [17,11]). Both have their merits but it seems fair to say that while the
general discourse level approach is too vague to be useful for our purpose, the
more precise approach advocated by the matching proposals is too restrictive to
be empirically very appropriate. To attain a theory of parallelism structuring, an
integration of both methods is called for, which combines the general insights of
discourse theories of parallelism with the precision of a given matching operation.
The second line of research which needs pursuing concerns the interaction
of sloppy/strict ambiguity with other linguistic phenomena. In section 7, we
have seen that colours allow for the integration of non-semantic information into
the semantic construction process. However, we have also seen cases in which
colours are not enough (cf. section 8). In particular, our analysis fails to predict
the ‘eliminative puzzles of ellipsis’. That is, it fails to capture the fact that in
discourses with n referring elements in the source, less that 2n readings are
actually available (cf. [3,5]) and some readings are ruled out. For these cases and
more generally, for a full treatment of how semantic construction interacts with
other levels of linguistic information, a more sophisticated apparatus is needed.
This is the subject of another paper.
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